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ABSTRACT
Systems based on Internet of Things (IoT) technologies may violate
user privacy if personal data they produce and use become available
to unauthorised agents. Recording provenance of IoT system be-
haviour may support assessment mechanisms ensuring compliance
of system components with data access constraints. In this paper,
we describe a prototype implementation of a provenance-enabled
MQTT broker enhanced with the ability to generate provenance
records describing the actual broker behaviour during message
forwarding. The implementation utilises a semantic stream based
approach for generating and analysing provenance data to discover
message forwarding to untrusted agents. The initial evaluation
demonstrates the feasibility of semantic solutions in this context.
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1 INTRODUCTION
IoT infrastructures consist of a number of physical and virtual
devices networked using a range of technologies.
The Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol
[1] is a lightweight publish/subscribe messaging protocol for M2M
communication. MQTT brokers are frequently used as an integral
part of IoT infrastructures to provide a communication bridge be-
tween different system components [4, 9].
We argue that ensuring transparency of such brokers is a critical
enabler for assessing various aspects of IoT systems such as account-
ability, privacy, quality and security. In this context, transparency
may include information on various aspects of the deployed system
such as broker configuration and the location where data process-
ing takes place; however, it may also include information regarding
data flows and agents that have access to the processed data.
For example, sensors deployed as part of an IoT system may be
collecting personal data such as users’ location, health informa-
tion, etc. In order to ensure privacy in such settings, it is important
that such data is not made available to unauthorised agents. In the
MQTT context, this means that the broker should not forward mes-
sages received under a certain topic to unauthorised subscribers. To
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achieve this, brokers may be extended with various authorisation
mechanisms [8], which are not part of the core MQTT specification
and hence not always implemented. If a broker was deployed with-
out such a protection layer, or the layer malfunctioned, the data
breach could be detected from logs generated during broker oper-
ation (e.g. information including timestamps, message payloads,
clients to which the message was forwarded, etc.). However, such
logs often exist as text files without any formally defined structure,
which makes their processing difficult. We argue that to enhance
the utility of such records, and the overall transparency of MQTT
brokers, these logs should be captured in a machine-understandable
format to enable intelligent audit processes to assess whether a
broker is behaving as expected.
In our prototype solution presented in this paper, we apply a
provenance-based approach to modelling of data describing an
MQTT broker’s operation during message forwarding. This pro-
duces provenance graphs that include entities (e.g. message topics),
agents (e.g. subscribers receiving messages), and activities (e.g. mes-
sage forwarding) as nodes and relationships between these concepts
as connecting edges. In our prototype, we also implement and eval-
uate the linked data stream approach [2] for creating provenance
streams that enable on-the-fly event detection without the need
for storage of elaborate logging data which could pose scalability
issues.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 The MQTT Protocol
The MQTT protocol (version 3.1.1) is an OASIS standard1 pub-
lish/subscribe messaging transport protocol for lightweight client-
server communication in IoT infrastructures. The protocol is typ-
ically run over TCP/IP networks with small transport overhead
and three basic message delivery quality assurances including the
following settings: message delivered at most once (QoS 0); at least
once (QoS 1); and exactly once (QoS 2). The protocol does not impose
any restrictions on the structure of the message payload.
2.2 MQTT-Plan, EP-Plan and PROV-O
Ontologies define types of concepts and relationships between them
that can be used to build semantic graphs. The graphs consist of
triples where each triple has three parts: subject, predicate, and
object. Each part of a triple is associated with a unique URI2. Graphs
can be queried by SPARQL3 queries returning instances that match
query patterns (Figure 1).
1http://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/os/mqtt-v3.1.1-os.html
2A prefix separated by : abstracts the repetitive parts of the URI. For example, ex: can
represent http://example.com#
3https://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/
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prov:used
ex:Topic1
(ep-plan:Entity)
ex:Publish
(ep-plan:Activity)
predicatesubject
ex:Publish ex:Topic1 
object
rdfs:typeex:Publish ep-plan:Activity
subject predicate object
prov:used
SELECT ?act
WHERE {
?act a ep-plan:Activity;
         prov:used ?topic.
?topic a ep-plan:Entity.
}
SPARQL Query  
returning ex:Publish as ?act  
Figure 1: An overview of semantic technologies for repre-
senting and querying graph data.
The MQTT-Plan [6] ontology defines a semantic vocabulary for
describing high level abstract plans associated with MQTT brokers
and their corresponding execution traces. The ontology captures
information that could be found by inspecting individual MQTT
control packets (e.g., message topics) and other information main-
tained by the broker (e.g. the identity of publishers and subscribers).
MQTT-Plan extends P-Plan [3], which enables descriptions of plans
as acyclic graphs in the form of a series of steps and variables rep-
resenting their inputs and outputs with links to the corresponding
parts of execution traces. MQTT-Plan also extends PROV-O [5], a
W3C Recommendation, which is used to record the execution trace
(i.e. the actual behaviour) as a collection of entities used and pro-
duced by activities, as well as agents that bear some responsibility
for those activities.
The EP-Plan ontology [7] is a recent extension of P-Plan (fully
compatible with MQTT-Plan) which enables additional metadata
(e.g., constraints) to be associated with plan descriptions and pro-
vides enhanced mechanisms for integrating provenance records
generated by different components (e.g. brokers, sensors, etc.) of a
complex IoT system.
2.3 C-SPARQL framework
The C-SPARQL framework4 utilises the C-SPARQL extension of
SPARQL (a query language for querying semantic graphs) to con-
struct continuous queries on streams of linked data [2]. The frame-
work integrates relational stream processing framework ESPER5
with a SPARQL engine to associate timestamps with individual
triples (i.e. individual statements captured in an RDF6 graph), which
are transformed into so-called quadruples. By extending SPARQL
with the concepts stream and window, continuous SPARQL queries
can be used to retrieve triples within some time range (i.e. a win-
dow) from a specific quadruple sequence. The C-SPARQL framework
provides methods to query only the most recent windows which
can be determined either by specific time (e.g. last 10 seconds) or
specific number of triples flowing through the stream (e.g. last 1000
triples).
3 PROVENANCE ENHANCED MOQUETTE
We have extended the opensource Moquette MQTT broker7 with a
set of classes integrating the C-SPARQL framework for processing
semantic streams and the JENA framework8 for creating semantic
4http://streamreasoning.org/resources/c-sparql
5http://www.espertech.com/esper/
6https://www.w3.org/RDF/
7https://github.com/moquette-io/moquette
8https://jena.apache.org
provenance graphs. Our implementation is available as an open
source project9.
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Figure 2: A provenance trace documenting message repub-
lishing with links to the corresponding plan description.
REGISTER QUERY myquery AS
PREFIX prov : < h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / ns / prov #>
PREFIX ep−p lan : < h t t p s : / / w3id . org / ep−p lan #>
PREFIX t l : < h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org #>
PREFIX ex : < h t t p : / / example . com / mqtt−p lan #>
Cons t ru c t {
? e l ementOfTrace ? s ?o .
? bund le ? x ?y .
}
FROM STREAM <h t t p : / / i o t s t r e ams > [RANGE TRIPLES 81000 ]
FROM <h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org / t r u s t edAgen t s >
WHERE {
? agen t ep−p lan : i sE l emen tO fTra c e ? bundle ;
ep−p lan : c o r r e s pond sToVa r i a b l e ex : A f f e c t edAgen t .
? a c t i v i t y prov : used ? t o p i c ; ep−p lan : i sE l emen tO fTra c e ? bund le .
? r e s u l t prov : wasGeneratedBy ? a c t i v i t y ; ep−p lan : i sE l emen tO fTra c e ? bund le ;
prov : hadMember ? agen t .
? t o p i c ep−p lan : i sE l emen tO fTra c e ? bundle ; prov : v a l u e " / t e s t " ;
ep−p lan : c o r r e s pond sToVa r i a b l e ex : Topic .
? e l ementOfTrace ep−p lan : i sE l emen tO fTra c e ? bund le ; ? s ?o .
? bund le ?x ?y .
FILTER NOT EXISTS { ? agen t a t l : Trus tedAgent . }
}
Listing 1: A C-SPARQL query used to examine the prove-
nance stream.
Figure 2 illustrates a provenance trace generated by a broker
using the MQTT-Plan, EP-Plan and PROV-O vocabularies and
its links to the corresponding plan description. To keep the in-
tegration lightweight we omitted entities from the provenance
record that represent message payloads and control packets, as
these were not required by our use case for detecting unautho-
rised message recipients. At the core of the provenance trace is
the ep-plan:Activity which represents a single execution of the
mqtt:Publish step. This is then linked to ep-plan:Entities represent-
ing individual topics and sender identities used to guide the publish
process, as well as the identity of an agent to which a message has
been forwarded. Each element of the execution trace is linked to
a unique ep-plan:ExecutionTraceBundle, which is a utility concept
to support querying of multiple provenance traces within a single
graph.
Every time a message is republished by the broker, a new prove-
nance trace is constructed using the MQTT-Plan, EP-Plan and
PROV-O vocabularies and is entered on the linked data stream.
A continuous C-SPARQL query (e.g., Listing 1) is then used to
9https://github.com/TrustLens/moquette-prov
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identify provenance information that documents non-compliance
(i.e. a message was forwarded to an unauthorised client) which is
then saved locally as a TTL10 file. The stored provenance graphs
documenting non-compliance can then be queried for relevant
information, using a query of the kind presented in Listing 2.
PREFIX ep−p lan : < h t t p s : / / w3id . org / ep−p lan #>
PREFIX t l : < h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org #>
PREFIX ex : < h t t p : / / example . com / mqtt−p lan #>
PREFIX mqtt : < h t t p : / / w3id . org / mqtt−p lan #>
PREFIX prov : < h t t p : / /www. w3 . org / ns / prov #>
SELECT D i s t i n c t ? s ende r ? r e c i p i e n t ? t ime
WHERE {
? senderVar a mqtt : Sender .
? s e n d e r En t i t y ep−p lan : c o r r e s pond sToVa r i a b l e ? senderVar ;
prov : a l t e r n a t eO f ? sende r .
? a c t i v i t y prov : used ? s e n d e r En t i t y ; prov : s t a r t edA tT ime ? t ime .
? r e s u l t prov : wasGeneratedBy ? a c t i v i t y ; prov : hadMember ? r e c i p i e n t e n t i t y .
? r e c i p i e n t e n t i t y prov : a l t e r n a t eO f ? r e c i p i e n t ;
ep−p lan : c o r r e s pond sToVa r i a b l e ? r e c i p i e n t V a r .
? r e c i p i e n t V a r a mqtt : A f f e c t edAgen t . }
Listing 2: An example SPARQL query for inspecting prove-
nance traces.
4 EVALUATION
In this section we describe the results of our initial evaluation of the
prototype implementation. The evaluation focused on the effects of
provenance mechanisms on the latency of delivered messages and
time required to process semantic streams under different scenarios
such as varying numbers of triples per processing window, number
of messages forwarded, etc.
4.1 Set up
The evaluation was performed on a virtual server instance run-
ing Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS with 72GB EDO DIMM and 4 CPU cores
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 0 @ 2.30GHz. The same server in-
stance was used to run the MQTT broker (started with 6GB of
heap size) and the pool of MQTT clients11 for publishing/receiving
messages, which were implemented using the PAHO Java library12.
The stream engine used the C-SPARQL query shown in Listing
1 to monitor the provenance stream. The content of each stream
window containing the provenance traces was merged with the
static knowledge-base which was loaded using the C-SPARQL en-
gine API during the broker’s startup process. The static knowledge
contained the identities of trusted agents (see Listing 3).
< h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org # sub−461> a < h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org # TrustedAgent > .
< h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org # sub−46> a < h t t p s : / / t r u s t l e n s . org # TrustedAgent > .
Listing 3: A portion of static knowledge encoded in the TTL
format. Each instance representing the ID of a known sub-
scriber is assigned the type TrustedAgent.
Since the stream windows that the query was evaluating con-
tained more than one provenance trace (with all elements contained
within an ep-plan:ExecutionBundle), the query identified bundles
that contained a record of the topic we were interested in observ-
ing (e.g. “/test”). Using SPARQL’s filtering function, the query also
selected all triples relating to bundles which contained a record of
10https://www.w3.org/TR/turtle/
11We experienced issues when generating more than 600 clients in a single Java
application. As a result, the pool of MQTT clients was created by executing multiple
jar files each creating 600 clients.
12https://www.eclipse.org/paho/
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Figure 3: Time required to process a stream of provenance
traces with varying processing window sizes against differ-
ent volumes of subscribers.
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Figure 4: Time required to process a stream of provenance
traces with varying numbers of processing windows against
different volumes of subscribers.
an agent receiving a published message, and whose identity was
not found in the static knowledge base of trusted agents.
If such triples were found, they were exported as a graph into
a local file. This graph then represented a provenance trace doc-
umenting a non-compliance episode. No other provenance traces
were stored by the system.
4.2 Results
Experiment 1 focused on identifying optimal sizes of processing
windows (i.e. number of triples perwindow).We created a pool of 3k,
6k and 12k subscribers which were listening to the topic “/test" and
one client publishingmessages under that topic with QoS 0.We then
varied the number of triples per processing window and measured
the time required to process all provenance traces generated when
a message was republished to all subscribers. For each setting, four
messages were sent during the warm up stage. This was followed
by three additional messages during which we measured the time
required to process the full provenance stream. We then averaged
the time from these three observations (the same approach was
applied to other experiments described in this section). Figure 3
and 4 show that the system performed best when the processing
load was split in 1-2 processing windows13. As illustrated by Figure
4 there seems to be a small saving if the overall processing load is
split into two windows.
Experiment 2 evaluated whether our implementation of prove-
nance mechanisms had any significant impact on the baseline per-
formance of the Moquette broker. We created different republishing
loads on the broker and measured the latency at which the mes-
sages were received by clients. In this experiment we again created
13Note that with 3k subscribers and window size set to 81k triples the system only
processed one window (i.e. the size of a single provenance trace describing message
forwarding to one subscriber is 27 triples)
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a network of a single publisher publishing under a single topic to a
pool of subscribers. Each message was associated with a timestamp,
which was generated when the message was sent, and each client
then calculated the latency based on the time when the message
was received. Table 1 shows a very small increase of 40 - 50 ms in
average message latency for 3k and 6k subscribers.
Number of subscribers 1200 3000 6000
Without provenance MIN 29 28 36
MAX 1039 1064 1105
AVG 532 545 552
With provenance MIN 35 31 35
MAX 1045 1106 1119
AVG 531 588 603
Table 1: Observed message latency in ms.
In Experiment 1, for every test we loaded a static knowledge base
containing 12k of triples and each test generated one provenance
trace of non-compliance identifying a single untrusted agent. In
Experiment 3, we were interested in evaluating whether the size
of the static knowledge base, and varying populations of trusted
and untrusted agents present in the stream had any impact on
processing time. We created a pool of 6k subscribers and set the
window size to 81k triples (based on the results from Experiment
1). We then varied the size of the static knowledge containing
information about trusted agents and the populations of untrusted
agents receiving messages.
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Time
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Figure 5: Time required to process a stream of provenance
traces with varying numbers of untrusted agents and vary-
ing static knowledgebase size.
Figure 5 shows the results, indicating that increasing the size of
the static knowledge base indeed has a negative impact on the time
required to process the provenance stream. However, the function of
the growth of processing time appears to be free of any exponential
increases that could hinder the scalability of the solution. Figure 5
also shows that the processing time is impacted by the number of
untrusted agents that are detected. This could be explained by the
higher demand for resources from file writing processes that have
to write larger files describing saved provenance traces. In future,
this could perhaps be improved by writing into an in-memory triple
store rather than onto a disk.
4.3 Limitations
Currently, the proposed approach has a number of limitations. For
example, it assumes that information captured in the static knowl-
edge base (i.e. the list of trusted agents) can be linked to the ID of
the MQTT client. An alternative approach could be to calculate the
trustworthiness of a client on the fly based on some characteristics
included in the provenance trace that can be observed by the broker
(e.g. sender’s location).
Another limitation is related to the case where the size of the
stream processing window is larger than the sum of the triples
contained by the generated provenance traces. Such a window
would not be evaluated until additional provenance traces had
filled the required window size. This could be mitigated by altering
the C-SPARQL engine implementation to force such windows to
be evaluated after a certain time period (e.g. 500ms).
Finally, using the same server instance to run the broker and the
client pool would mean more CPU demand which could have an
effect on the observed performance results.
5 CONCLUSIONS & FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented a partial implementation of a semantic
provenance-based transparency mechanism within a third party
MQTT broker. Our initial evaluation results suggest that imple-
menting semantic solutions within middleware IoT components
offers a feasible and potentially scalable approach to enhance their
auditability.
In our future work, we will focus on extending the provenance
mechanisms to cover other parts of a broker’s behaviour (e.g. han-
dling connection requests) as well as updating the MQTT-Plan on-
tology to align with the recently introduced version 5 of the MQTT
protocol14. We will also explore the opportunities for recording
additional plan metadata provided by the EP-Plan ontology and
integration of MQTT provenance in the wider IoT system context.
We also plan to test the separation of the stream processing engine
from the broker in a distributed network set up.
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